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pensation Act 70 and the Occupational Diseases Act, 71 each has
been re-written and re-enacted. The most important change is
one which provides for an increase in regard to the amount recoverable for specific losses covered by these two statutes as
well as an overall increase of 13 % in the maximum weekly benefits.

II. CONTRACTS
Although issues concerning the right of a person doing business under an assumed name' to sue for breach of contract have
2
beeh before the Illinois Appellate Court on two prior occasions,
it was not until the Illinois Supreme Court took jurisdiction of
the case of Grody v. Scalone,3 on a claim that the so-called "assumed name" statute was unconstitutional, that the law on the
subject was clarified. The plaintiff there had sold and installed
a furnace for which the defendant had failed to pay. When sued,
the defendant relied on the plaintiff's non-compliance with the
statute to support a claim that the contract was against public
policy, hence unenforcible. The Supreme Court, recognizing that
the penal provisions of the statute were sanctions intended to aid
in its enforcement, indicated that, as the legislature had expressed
the penalty for violation, no room was left for further implementation. The requirement of registration by one doing business
under an assumed name, it said, was planned for the benefit of
those who might deal with such a person, particularly for the purpose of supplying information relating to credit and the like.
As the statute did not declare the contracts made by such a person to be illegal, the court refused to achieve that result but it
§ 138.1 et seq.
71 Laws 1951, p. 1095, H.B. 1254; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 172.36 et seq.
1 In. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 96, § 4 et seq., requires a person doing business
under an assumed name to file a certificate to that effect with the County Clerk of
the county.
2 See Mickelson v. Kolb, 337 Ill. App. 493, 86 N. E. (2d) 152 (1949), noted in 27
CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 327, and Franks v. Coront, 341 I1. App. 137, 93 N. E.
(2d) 157 (1950).
3 405 Ill. 61, 96 N. E. (2d) 97 (1950), noted in 29 CHICAGo-KET LAW REVIEW 282
and 39 Ill. B. J. 308. See also Cohen v. Lerhman, 408 Il1. 155, 96 N. E. (2d) 528
(1951).
70 Laws 1951, p. 1060, H.B. 1253; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48,
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did distinguish the case from situations wherein unlicensed real
estate brokers have sued for fees or commissions. '
Alleged and also valid agreements to bequeath or devise have
often been before the Illinois courts. In every instance, the plaintiff has been required to make proof of the contract by clear and
certain evidence and, in case the alleged promise affected real
estate, to meet the additional requisite of a "writing" or a sufficient performance to take the case out of the operation of the
Statute of Frauds.4 In Wilger v. Wilger,5 the testimony of a large
number of disinterested persons together with admissions by the
decedent made the case a close one, especially since the claimant
had made substantial improvements to the premises. The Supreme Court, however, consistent with many prior decisions, held
that the evidence fell short of establishing the terms and conditions of the agreement with sufficient definiteness to warrant a decree for specific performance, thereby adding further strength to
the idea of the desirability of "getting it in writing." Other contract cases are discussed under appropriate sub-headings.
INSURANCE

Three significant cases involving problems in insurance law

found their way to courts of review during this survey period.
In the first, that of CanadianRadium & Uranium Corporationv.
Indemnity Insurance Company of North America,6 the plaintiff
sought reimbursement from the insurer, under a comprehensive
general liability policy, for money paid out in settlement of a
suit brought against it by an employee of Radium Industries,
Inc., a licensee of plaintiff engaged in manufacturing a certain
ointment for it. The employee had alleged that she had become
poisoned by exposure to radio-active vapor and other materials,
used in the preparation of the ointment, because of a failure on
the part of the Illinois agent to provide proper safeguards or to
warn her of the risks involved. The insurer, although properly
Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 59, § 2.
5409 Ill. 58, 98 N. E. (2d) 716 (1951).
6342 I11. App. 456, 97 N. E. (2d) 132 (1951), noted in 1951 Ill. L. Forum 331.

4 11.
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notified, had refused to defend against the employee's suit on the
ground that the policy provided coverage only against accidental
injury.7 It urged the same defense in the instant ease and succeeded thereon, both in the trial court and in the Appellate Court
for the First District.
Plaintiff had contended that the word "accident," as used in
the policy, should be defined not only to embrace injuries "traceable to a definite time and place of origin" but also to cover "occupational diseases gradually contracted over a period of time"
since the affliction, that is the ultimate result of an exposure to
harmful occupational conditions, was entirely unforeseen and unexpected. While the court agreed that some of the cases cited lent
support to such a definition of the word "accident," it held that
prior Illinois decisions, some invoking a construction of the Workmen's Compensation Act s and others centering around the interpretation of the word "accident" as used in accident insurance policies, 9 had established that "in order that the disability be by reason
of an accidental injury or the result of an accident, it must be traceable to a definite time and place of origin. "10 Dictionary definitions
given to the word "accident" have also stressed the necessity of
the happening of a definite event rather than the gradual decline
of bodily resistance caused by daily exposure to deleterious ma-

terials resulting in disease or death."
The second case, that of Hannig v. Hartford Accident & In7 Under the policy provisions, the insurer agreed to pay all sums for which the
insured might become obligated by reason of "bodily injury, sickness or disease ...
sustained by any person . . . caused by accident," as well as to defend any suit
seeking damages therefor, "even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent."
See 342 Ill. App. 456 at 459, 97 N. E. (2d) 132 at 134.
8 Peru Plow & Wheel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 311 Ill. 216, 142 N. E. 546
(1924) ; Labanowski v. Hoyt Metal Co., 292 Ill. 218, 126 N. E. 548 (1920).
9 Brodek v. Indemnity Ins. Co.. 292 Ill. App. 363, 11 N. E. (2d) 228 (1937);
Belleville Enameling Co. v. United States Casualty Co., 266 111. App. 586 (1932).
'0 342 Ill. App. 456 at 468, 97 N. E. (2d) 132 at 138.
11 See Black, Law Dict., 3rd Ed., and Webster, New International Dict., 2 Ed. An
attempt to avoid the effect of the prior Illinois decisions, on the basis that the policy
sued on was a New York contract, was unsuccessful because New York law on the
point was precisely the same as that of Illinois: Jackson v. Employers' Liab.
Assurance Corp., 259 N. Y. 559, 182 N. E. 180 (1932); Lerner v. Rump Bros., .241
N. Y. 153, 149 N. E. 334, 41 A. L. R. 1122 (1925) ; Jeffreyes v. Charles H. Sager Co.,
233 N. Y. 535, 135 N. E. 907 (1922) ; Rosenthal v. National Aniline & Chemical Co.,
216 App. Div. 588, 215 N. Y. S. 621 (1921). See also United States Radium Corp. v.
Globe Indemnity Co., 116 N. J. L. 90, 182 A. 626 (1936).
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demnity Company, 12 concerned the application of a provision
of the Illinois Insurance Code, one which requires that no liability policy shall be issued unless it contains a provision that
the insolvency or bankruptcy of an insured should not serve to
release the insurer in case execution against the insured be returned unsatisfied, and which permits action by the judgment
creditor against the insurer in such a case. 18 The insurer there
contended that the plaintiff, after recovery of a judgment against
the insured, could not maintain an action against it without allegation and proof of due issuance and return of an execution marked
unsatisfied, said to be an absolute condition precedent to any liability on the part of the insurer. The law of New York 14 and of
New Jersey,' 5 where the statutory provision is the same as that
of Illinois, would seem to so hold, but because of other language
contained in the policy in question, 16 the court found itself freed
from the duty of interpreting the Illinois provision.'- "If," said
the court, "the policy gives a greater benefit to the injured party
and eliminates one of the steps required by the statute before
suit can be brought directly against the insurance carrier, then
the terms of the policy govern.""' In that regard, the case conforms to decisions in other jurisdictions."
The third case worthy of discussion, that of Cross v. Zurich
General Accident Liability Insurance Company,2 was one in
which the insurbd sought a declaratory judgment that the carrier
would be liable, on the facts presented, under a public liability
policy requiring it to pay all sums which the insured should be12342 Il. App. 539, 97 N. E. (2d) 476 (1951).
13 11. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 73, § 1000.
14 Jacobs v. Maryland Casualty Co., 198 App. Div. 470, 191 N. Y. S. 692 (1921),
affirmed in 234 N. Y. 622, 138 N. E. 472 (1922).
15 Universal Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Caltagirone, 119 N. J. Eq. 491, 182 A. 862 (1936).
16 The provision read: "It is understood and agreed that upon failure of the company to pay any such final judgment recovered against the insured, the judgment
creditor may maintain an action ... against the company to compel such payment.
The bankruptcy or insolvency of the insured shall not relieve the company of any of
its obligations hereunder .. " 342 Ill. App. 539 at 546, 97 N. E. (2d) 476 at 478.
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 73, § 1000.
18 342 Ill. App. 539 at 549, 97 N. E. (2d) 476 at 480.
19 See Bass v. Standard Accident Ins. Co. of Detroit, 70 F. (2d) 86 (1934);
Kindervater v. Motorists Casualty Ins. Co., 117 N. J. L. 131, 187 A. 362 (1936).
20 184 F. (2d) 609 (1950), noted in 1951 Ill.
L. Forum 333.
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come obligated to pay by reason of any liability imposed upon
him by law for damages because of injury to property "caused
by accident." The plaintiff was engaged in the business of cleaning building exteriors. Finding that the chemicals generally used
were ineffective for a particular job, plaintiff caused a minute percentage of hydrofluoric acid to be added to the normal chemical
solution and adopted customary protective methods to avoid injury to window glass from the presence of the hydrofluoric
acid. Despite this, some window glass was damaged and a number of claims were filed with plaintiff. The insurer disclaimed liability on the ground that the damage was not caused by accident
and the trial court agreed, on the basis that the planned use of
a chemical known to be harmful to glass prevented the injury
from being unforeseen, unexpected, or unusual.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the test for negligence which the trial court
had applied was inapplicable in determining what should constitute an accident under the terms of the public liability policy before it. Illinois precedent, limited though it be, seems to point to
the conclusion that a question as to whether or not an injury
is accidental should be determined from the standpoint of the
person injured.2 1 The problem then would simply be one as to
whether or not the plaintiff intended to do damage to the glass.
A negative answer would seem dictated in view of the protective
measures taken to eliminate the known risk, albeit such measures
proved ineffective. Absent wilful action on the plaintiff's part,
the resulting damage was accidental even though caused by negligence. The lower court, instead of applying the test for negligence, had had recourse to the test followed by Illinois courts in
the "accidental means" cases. 2 2 It would seem as if such a test
is not to be applied where the policy protects against liability for
28
injury "caused by accident."
21 E. J. Albrecht Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 289 Ill. App. 508,
7 N. E. (2d) 626 (1937).
22 Higgins v. Maryland Casualty Co., 281 Ill. 431, 118 N. E. 11 (1917); Paoli v.
Loyal Protection Ins. Co., 289 Ill. App. 87, 6 N. E. (2d) 909 (1937) ; Wayne v. The
Travelers Ins. Co., 220 Ill. App. 493 (1921).
23 till v. Standard Mutual Cas. Co., 110 F. (2d) 1001 (1940) ; E. J. Albrecht Co.
v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 289 Ill. App. 508, 7 N. E. (2d) 626 (1937).

SURVEY

OF ILLINOIS LAW-1950-1951

Legislative enactments in 1951 affecting insurance law pertained principally to company matters. Among such changes were
an increase in the amount of the deposit required from title guaranty companies ;24 a change in the minimum surplus requirement
relating to domestic mutuals hereafter organized ;25 still others
affecting the organization of reciprocals 2 6 and the kinds of business in which they may engage ;27 and a further broadening of the
field for investment of funds of domestic companies. 28 The legislature has also prescribed new policy forms to be used, after Jan29
uary 1, 1952, in the case of accident and health insurance.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMBNTS

While only one case involving negotiable instruments law is
worthy of attention, that case presented a complicated factual as
well as an unusual legal problem. In Schmelzle v. Transportation
Investment Corporation,30 the defendant-drawer had delivered a
check to an officer of the payee. It was then endorsed by the plaintiff, as an accommodation for the payee, and thereafter delivered
to a third person who, in turn, cashed the check at a distant bank.
On presentation to the drawee bank, the check was dishonored.
Plaintiff, on demand of the endorsee bank, paid to it the amount
represented by the check and then sued the drawer on the instrument. The latter contended that the check in question had been
given to the payee, in exchange for two other checks totalling the
same amount drawn by the payee, on the understanding that defendant's check would not be deposited until the two received in
exchange had cleared. After alleging that these checks had never
24 Laws 1951, p. 1575, H.B. 1086; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 73, §§ 479-80.
25 Laws 1951, p. 1565, H.B. 674; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 73, §§ 655, 657,
662 and 663.
26 Laws 1951, p. 605, H.B. 481; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 73, § 677.
27 Laws 1951, p. 605, H.B. 481; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 73, § 678.
28 Laws 1951, p. 1567, H.B. 819; Il1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 73, § 737, particularly clause 1(o). The new law permits, with certain restrictions, investments in
bonds or other obligations, payable from revenue specifically pledged to that end,
by a state, municipality or any civil division thereof.
29 Laws 1951, p. 611, H.B. 185; Il. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 73, § 968a to § 974a,
inclusive.
30341 Ill. App. 639, 94 N. E. (2d) 682 (1950), noted in 29 CHICA0o-KENT LAW
REVEW 184 and 39 Ill. B. J. 300.
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been paid, defendant claimed the resulting failure of consideration constituted a good defense. The trial court dismissed this
special defense and granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Court for the Second District, on appeal,
affirmed the ruling below.
Although the issue involved might be simply stated to be one
as to whether or not an accommodation endorser for a payee, compelled to take up the instrument, is subject to personal defenses
which the drawer may have against the payee, the point would
seem to be one not previously decided in Illinois. 31 The court
noted that, by statute, a failure of consideration would be a valid
defense against a payee3 2 although it would be of no avail against
a holder in due course. 3 1 The plaintiff, however, was not a holder
in due course, 34 even though it could not be said that he was in
the position of one endorsing with knowledge of defects, for no
claim was asserted that he knew at the time he lent his name to the
paper that the consideration had failed. Furthermore, he could
not be considered as a mere donee, for value had been given by
him for the paper, although not until after it had been dishonored.
As a consequence, plaintiff fell into a category not fully nor
clearly covered by either the Illinois statute or the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act. This is true because the only provision
of either statute bearing upon the rights of one secondarily liable,
who has satisfied his liability when properly called upon, would
seem to leave such a person without remedy. That provision,
noting that the instrument is not discharged, states that the party
so paying is "remitted to his former rights as regards all prior
parties." 3 5 The accommodation endorser, however, being unconnected with the title of the instrument, has no former rights to
which it would be possible to remit him. The phrase in question,
then, creates an ambiguity when applied to an accommodation en31 The only prior decision which might cover the problem is Graves v. Neeves, 183
Ill. App. 235 (1931). Headnotes to an abstract opinion therein would indicate that
the court reached a comparable result.
32 111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 98, § 48.
33 Ibid., § 78.
34 Ibid., § 72.
35 Unif. Laws Anno., Vol. 5, § 121; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 98, § 142.
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dorser for a payee, unless it could be argued that it was the legislative intention to allow one in the plaintiff's position to go without
a remedy 6
Finding that the Negotiable Instruments Act provided no
answer,3 7 the court then had resort to a common-law doctrine
which holds that an accommodation endorser for a payee who
takes up an instrument is to be treated as a purchaser, and entitled
to recover against the drawer, provided he lacked notice of any
38
defense at the time he placed his signature upon the paper.
While such a person could not properly be called a holder in due
course, he would, on the theory of subrogation, be entitled to
comparable rights. The decision squares with cases from other
39
jurisdictions where the problem has arisen.
QUASI-CONTRACTS

It has been the view in some states that, upon rescission of an
express contract for the sale of land, an implied contract arises
between the parties entitling the vendee to recover the amount of
all payments made under the express contract less a reasonable
sum for use and occupation made of the vendor's premises. 40 This
*view proceeds on the theory that to hold otherwise might work an
unconscionable forfeiture. Other states, including Illinois, deny
a recovery, provided the contract contains an express provision
covering the consequence of a default, provided the vendor is
ready, willing and able to perform, and provided there is nomutual agreement to rescind the sale. 4 1 The issue in Tucker v.
36 For a recognition, and discussion, of this ambiguity, see Chafee, "The Reacquisition of a Negotiable Instrument by a Prior Party," 21 Col. L. Rev. 538 (1921), and
note in 28 Harv. L. Rev. 102. See also Beutell's Brannan, Negotiable Instrument
Law (W. H. Anderson Co., Cincinnati, 1948), 7th Ed., p. 1167.
37 But see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 98, § 218.
38 Andrews v. Meadow, 133 Ala. 442, 31 So. 971 (1901) ; Breckenridge v. Lewis, 84
Me. 349, 24 A. 864 (1892) ; Reinhart v. Schall, 69 Md. 352, 16 A. 126 (1888) ; Barber
v. Parker, 76 Mass. (10 Gray) 339 (1858).
39 Williams v. Walker, 66 Cal. App. 672, 226 P. 939 (1924) ; Lill v. Gleason, 92
Kan. 754, 142 P. 287 (1914).
40 Dooley v. Stillson, 46 R. I. 332, 128 A. 217, 52 A. L. R. 1505 (1925).
41 See abst. opinions in Forest Preserve Corp. v. Miller, 307 Ill. App. 243, 30 N. E.
(2d) 126 (1940), and in Morrey v. Bartlett, 288 Ill. App. 620, 6. N. E. (2d) 290
(1937).
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Beam,4 2 therefore, became one as to whether or not, on the
vendee's default, the express' contract had been properly terminated, entitling the vendor to retain the payments made, or had
been rescinded by mutual agreement. The Appellate Court for
the Fourth District, affirming a decision of the trial court in favor
of the vendor, refused to enter into a discussion as to whether or
not there was a semantic problem involved in the indiscriminate
use of the words '' rescission," 'cancellation," and ''termination,''
by concluding that the vendee had abandoned all rights under the
contract, hence could not recover any excess in payment over a
sum equal to a reasonable charge for use and occupation.
By way of contrast, there has been recognition in Illinois,
since prior to statehood, of the equitable doctrine under which
one who, while in possession, erroneously improves the land of
another but who is subsequently ousted by paramount title is
permitted to recover as on a quasi-contract for the value of the
betterment made less any damage done to the property. 43 The
present' statute contemplates, however, that the claim for compensation should be advanced and decided in the suit for possession of the land, 44 on the theory that all issues could best be
settled at one time. It was for this reason, in Loehde v. Rudnick,45
that the Supreme Court held that the claim for reimbursement for
betterments made came too late, when urged some twelve years
later in a land registration proceeding, inasmuch as the ousted
claimant had not advanced the question prior to that time. 46
SALES

A frequent bone of contention, in cases on the law of sales,
is one relating to the time point at which title passes from seller
to buyer. It was the main issue in Tupman T hurlow Company,
42 343 Ill. App. 290, 98 N. E. (2d) 871 (1951).
43 See Philbrick, Laws of Illinois Territory 1809-1818, Ill. Hist. Coll., Vol. 25,
p. 41.
44 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 45, § 56 et seq.
45 409 111. 73, 98 N. E. (2d) 719 (1951).
46 If not advanced in the ejectment proceeding, the claim would have to be brought
within five years, as a suit in general assumpsit, according to Inl. Rev. Stat. 1951,
Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 16.
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Inc. v. Cook,4 7 under a c. i. f. Pacific Coast contract 4 8 covering
goods to be shipped from New Zealand to Vancouver, B. C., and
from there to Chicago. The seller had undertaken the obligation
of paying duty on behalf of the purchaser at Vancouver and of
arranging for rail transportation to, and delivery of the goods in,
Chicago. It was held that title passed at the shipping port in
New Zealand, not only because of the c. i. f. provisions but also
because of certain additional contract terms specifying that war
risk insurance should be purchased for the buyer's account and
regarding payment of the duty on the buyer's behalf, said to be
indicative of an intent that the buyer should acquire title to the
goods as soon as they were delivered to the carrier at the original
shipping point. The seller's obligation of seeing to it that the
goods were transported from Vancouver to Chicago was said to
have no effect upon the passage of title as the seller, in performing
this obligation, was merely acting as the buyer's agent.
The case of Williams v. Paducah Coca Cola Bottling Company49 would be no different than other warranty cases if it were
not for the fact it contains some unfortunate statements which,
it is to be hoped, will not be accepted by other courts. The plaintiff there had purchased a bottle of soft drink from a grocer and
had consumed part of the contents when he discovered a match
box cover in the bottle and became ill. At the ensuing trial, in
an action against the bottling company based upon an implied
warranty of wholesomeness, it was shown that the grocer kept
the bottles in an ice container near the front door of the store
where the bottles were accessible to anyone who desired to raise
the lid, and that customers of the grocer frequently served themselves therefrom. On the basis of this proof, the Appellate Court
for the Fourth District reversed a lower court judgment in favor
of the plaintiff. While it recognized that a previous Appellate
Court decision from another district had adopted the existence
of an implied warranty of fitness for human consumption of
47 342 Ill. App. 344, 96 N. E. (2d) 666 (1950).

Leave to appeal has been denied.
A type of contract under which the purchaser pays a fixed price which covers
the cost of the goods, the insurance, and the freight.
49 343 Il1. App. 1, 98 N. E. (2d) 164 (1951).
48
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food products sold in sealed containers or bottles, one running
not only from the retailer but also from the manufacturer or
bottler to the consumer despite lack of privity, 50 it was of the opinion that such a warranty did not go so far as to insure that no
one would tamper with the product after it left the control of
the manufacturer or bottler and before it reached the ultimate
consumer. Under this circumstance, it would become necessary
for the consumer, attempting to fix liability upon a manufacturer
or bottler, to assume the burden of proving that the condition of
the food product at the time of sale to him was the same as it
was when it left the control of the manufacturer or bottler.
In the particular case, the bottles were not only accessible to
members of the public but were sealed with removable crown caps
of a type which would make it possible for a person so disposed
to remove the cap, insert a foreign object, and reseal the bottle
without this fact being readily detected. It can easily be surmised,
however, that a general application of the rule of proof laid down
would virtually nullify the possibility of recovery against a
manufacturer, upon the basis of an implied warranty of fitness
for consumption, in cases relating to food products sold in sealed
containers.
One slight statutory amendment has been made in Section 1
of the Bulk Sales Act51 so that it now provides that the purchaser
shall, at least ten days before payment of the price, notify the
seller's creditors of the impending sales transaction. The time
period was previously set at five days.
SURETYSHIP

Althouh no cases have been decided dealing with the law of
suretyship as that topic of the law is generally understood, one
issue concerning a right to subrogation was developed in the case
of Weaver v. Hodge.5 2 A state employee had been negligently
50 Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 332 Ill. App. 117, 74 N. E. (2d)
162 (1947), noted In 26 CirIOAGO-KENT LAW RLViEw 23-4.
51 Laws 1951, p. 1200, S.B. 124; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 121%, § 78.
52 406 Ill. 537, 94 N. E. (2d) 297 (1950), noted in 29 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIW
284.
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killed while on the job as a consequence of which claims were
advanced against the State of Illinois, by the dependent widow,
for workmen's compensation and also for pension benefits under
the state retirement system. 53 The state honored both demands,
but took credit, pursuant to law, 54 on the pension claim for
the amount paid by way of workmen's compensation benefits. It
thereafter intervened, in a wrongful death action brought by the
administrator of the deceased employee against the negligent
third person, to enforce a lien against the proceeds of that suit
to secure reimbursement for the amount so paid out. 5 5 Both the
trial court and the Supreme Court denied a right to a lien on the
ground that the state had, by its election to reduce the primary
obligation to pay pension benefits, lost the privilege of subrogation
afforded by the Workmen's Compensation Act. To hold otherwise would have given the state duplicate credits against both its
secondary and its primary liability.
III. CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
AVAILABILITY

OF REMEDIES

Two important decisions relating to the jurisdiction of inferior Illinois courts were produced by the Illinois Supreme Court
during the survey period. In the first, that of Turnbaugh v.
Dunlop,' the court placed a sharp limitation on, if not virtually
reversing, the holding in Werner v. Illinois Central Railroad
Company.2 The last mentioned case had declared that an Illinois
city court was without jurisdiction to entertain a transitory tort
cause of action arising beyond the municipal limits for the reason
that it was a court "in and for" the city. On the basis of certain
amendments which had been made in the statute since that decision, the Supreme Court, through the medium of the Turnbaugh
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138 et seq., and Vol. 2, Ch. 127, § 215 et seq.
Ibid., Ch. 127, § 225.
55 Ibid., Ch. 48, § 166, provides a lien in favor of an employer who has paid a
compensation award.
1406 Ill. 573, 94 N. E. (2d) 438 (1950), noted in 39 Ill. B. J. 305.
2379 Ill. 559, 42 N. E. (2d) 82 (1942). The decision interpreted.Ill. Rev. Stat.
1941, Ch. 37, § 333.
53
54

